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Asset-Backed Securitization:
Is Congressional Intervention Necessary?
by Craig D. Bloom*

INTRODUCTION

Corporations need cash to run their businesses and to invest in projects.
Traditionally, they have raised the necessary funds by way of secured and
unsecured loans or through the issuance of securities to investors. During the
1970s, the financial markets developed a new way for these corporations to raise

capital.
The process, referred to as asset-backed securitization,' involves the
creation of a "bankruptcy remote" Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") that
purchases the receivables from the company that Originated them (the
"Originator"). The bankruptcy remote SPV is structured so that it is unlikely to
commence, or have commenced against it, a bankruptcy case.2 The SPV raises
the funds to purchase the receivables by selling securities in the public or private
debt securities markets. The entire transaction is structured in a manner that
seeks to remove the assets from the estate of the corporation in the event of its
bankruptcy.
Banks and other loan facilities are involved in the transaction and
assume significant credit risk associated with the receivables. The banks offer
third-party credit enhancement to ensure the payment of the securities issued by
the SPV. 3 The credit enhancements are usually in the form of a guaranty, surety
* Craig D. Bloom is an Analyst with Goldin Associates, L.L.C., Special Consultant and Financial
Advisor to Harrison J. Goldin, the court-appointed Examiner in the Enron North America Corp.
bankruptcy proceeding. He earned a Bachelors of Science in Business Administration from the State
University of New York at Buffalo and a Juris Doctor from Hofstra University School of Law. He
has interned for the Honorable Arthur D. Spatt in the United States District Court, Eastern District of
New York and the Honorable Melanie L. Cyganowski in the United States Bankruptcy Court,
Eastern District of New York. He would like to thank Hofstra University Bankruptcy Law Professor
Alan N. Resnick.
"The terms 'securitization,' 'asset-backed securitization,' and 'structured finance' are used
interchangeably" to refer "to a company's use of cash flows from its assets to raise funding. The
term 'securitization' specifically refers to the issuance of securities backed by such cash flows."
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FtN. 133, 133 n.1
(1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy].
2 See The Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, StructuredFinancingTechniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 534 (1995) [hereinafter
Committee].
3 Credit enhancement is a method of protecting investors in the event that cash flows from the
underlying assets are insufficient to pay the interest and principal due for the security in a timely
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bond, letter of credit, or an irrevocable credit line.4 Credit enhancement is a
distinctive feature of asset-backed securitization that occurs "when a security's
credit quality is raised above that of the sponsor's unsecured debt or that of the
underlying asset pool."'5 In addition, Originators will often offer internal credit
enhancements to support the securities. However, as discussed infra, this
support must be limited so that the transfer is not characterized as a secured loan
transaction.
In order for the SPV to sell securities in the public markets one of the
nationally recognized rating agencies 6 must rate the financial instruments based
on creditworthiness, probability of default, and the value of any assets or other
credit enhancements that support them. 7 Firms want their securities rated highly
because that will lead to a lower interest rate and greater returns. To obtain a
high rating, the rating agency will want assurance that if the Originator enters
bankruptcy, the receivables will not become part of the bankruptcy estate. 8 Of
course, if the securities are sold to a private investor, ratings are not always
necessary since sophisticated investors themselves can evaluate the risks. 9
Firms securitize their assets in order to fund special projects or simply
for working capital.1 ° The objective is to inexpensively turn receivables and
other assets into cash that can be used immediately, while at the same time
removing the assets from the balance sheet, thus, improving the company's
financial ratios."
The benefits of asset-backed securitization "include
improving liquidity, increasing diversification of funding sources, lowering the

manner. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS, ASSET
SECURITIZATION, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 11 (November 1997).

4 A guaranty is a promise made by a third party to reimburse a trust for losses up to a stated
maximum dollar amount. They can also agree to advance principal and interest as necessary and buy
back defaulted loans. A surety bond is an insurance policy provided by a rated and regulated
insurance company to reimburse the ABS for any losses incurred. A letter of credit is issued by a
financial institution, typically a bank, which is paid a fee to stand by with cash to reimburse the trust
for any losses actually incurred, up to the required credit-enhancement amount.
http://www.investinginbonds.com; See Stephen L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION, at 13 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Schwarz, Structured
Finance].
5 See http://www.investinginbonds.com.
6 The United States has four nationally recognized rating agencies: Standard & Poor's Ratings
Group, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Fitch Investors Service Inc., and Duff& Phelps, Inc.
7 See Patrina R. Dawson, Rating Games with Contingent Transfer: A StructuredFinanceIllusion, 8
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 381, 382 [hereinafter Dawson] (describing the "Rating Continuum").
8 The rating agencies will look at the insulation of the assets from the insolvency of the Originator in
determining the rating. See Id. at 383-84 (allowing for higher ratings based on creditworthiness of
isolated assets not creditworthiness of Originator).
9 Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, 138-39.
10See Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured CreditorsPerspective, 76 TEX. L. REv.
595, 605 (1998) [hereinafter Lupica] (stating, "firms securitize their assets for the same reason firms
borrow money: to raise money for either special projects or working capital.").
" For instance, asset securitization improves a company's return on assets and return on equity by
decreasing the firm's assets without increasing its liabilities. Return on assets (net income divided
by average total assets) and return on equity (net income divided by average equity) are standard
measures of financial performance.
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effective interest rate,2 improving risk management, and achieving accountingrelated advantages."'1
Asset-backed securitization is a practical and advantageous alternative
to traditional financing. However, several problems arise in the context of
bankruptcy. Section 541(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Code")
provides that upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an estate is created
consisting of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case."' 3 Therefore, although steps have been taken to
keep the assets out of a potential bankruptcy estate, once in bankruptcy, the
trustee or debtor-in-possession will attempt to include the assets in the estate by
attacking the asset-backed securitization.
This article will begin by describing asset-backed securitization and
how it is accomplished, focusing on the steps taken by Originators to remove the
assets from the jurisdiction of a Bankruptcy Court. This article will then discuss
the benefits of asset-backed securitization from the perspective of the Originator
as well as the common attacks against it in the context of bankruptcy. Next, the
article will describe recent developments including a controversial court
decision and a proposed amendment to the United States Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, it will conclude by arguing that the decision by Congress to remove the
proposed amendment was appropriate.

I.

DESCRIPTION OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION

Over the past 20 years asset-backed securitization has become a
popular financing method for corporations seeking to convert a predictable
future income stream into current cash. 14 Also known as structured finance, its
purpose is to legally isolate assets from the transferor's potential bankruptcy
estate so that the purchaser of securities backed by the assets can rely solely on
the creditworthiness of those assets, instead of relying on the company's overall
financial strength.' 5 It has been defined as:
The sale of equity or debt instruments, representing
ownership interests in, or secured by, a segregated,
income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a
transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain
risks inherent in owning or lending against the
underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are
more readily marketable and, thus, more liquid than
12See

Lupica, supra note 10, at 605 (stating, "by definition, the process of securitization transforms

future payments into instant cash.").
"3See 11 U.S.C. 54 1(a) (2003).
14See Lupica, supra note 10, at 618 (stating, "by definition, the process of securitization transforms
future payments into instant cash); See also Robert Dean Ellis, Securitization Vehicles, Fiduciary
Duties, and Bondholders Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 295, 296 (1999) [hereinafter Ellis] (finding "asset
securitization has quite rapidly become a popular form of financing").
ISSee Schwarz, Structured Finance, supra note 4, at 16.
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ownership interests
underlying assets.16

in and

loans against

the

The company seeking financing through securitization, referred to as
the Originator, begins by identifying and isolating the pool of assets it will use. 7
Although, the assets chosen usually consist of the right to payment in the future
and are typically referred to as "receivables," asset-backed securitization can be
accomplished through the use of many different types of financial assets.' 8 Most
importantly, the pool of assets should have a predictable stream of income. 19 A
more predictable income stream will lead to
20 a higher rating for the securities and
provide a greater return for the Originator.
In order to securitize the assets, the Originator will utilize SPVs,
through which it will complete the financing transactions.21 SPVs can be
formed as several different types of legal entities, such as a corporation or a
trust. 22 Typically, the SPV will have just been created so that it has no claims
against it.23 During the SPV's formation stage the Originator will take the steps
necessary to ensure the SPV is unlikely to voluntarily file for bankruptcy or
have an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed against it. 24 In addition, steps will

16See Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colleta, Asset Securitization:Evolution, CurrentIssues and
New Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REv. 1369, 1374 (1991) [hereinafter Shenker].
17See Peter J. Lahny IV, Asset Securitization:A Discussion of the TraditionalBankruptcy Attacks
and an Analysis ofthe Next PotentialAttack, Substantive Consolidation,9 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 815, 829 (2001) (describing a prototypical securitization transaction) [hereinafter Lahny].
is See Committee, supra note 2, 532 (noting, "the assets that can be securitized through structured
financings are virtually limitless.").
'9 Id. (stating, "the cash flow or liquidation value of the assets must be predictable. Unless cash flow
or liquidation value can be predicted reliably, the securities that can be supported by the assets
cannot be determined ... this predictability is at the heart of the evaluation by the rating agencies.");
See also, Shenker, supra note 16, at 1376-77 (stating "most transactions involve large numbers of
homogenous assets pooled together. Assets most suitable for securitization are those with
standardized terms, delinquency and loss experience that can support an actuarial analysis of
expected losses, and uniform underwriting standards and servicing procedures satisfactory to ratings
agencies and investors.").
20See Teresa N. Kerr, Bowie Bonding in the Music Biz: Will Music Royalty Securitization be the Key
to the Goldfor Music Industry Participants?,7 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 367, 372 (2000) (explaining "if
the payments on the assets are predictable, the assets will receive a higher valuation from the 'rating
agencies."'); Committee, supra note 2, at 532 (discussing the importance of predictability in
evaluation by rating agencies).
21See Committee, supra note 2, at 553-54 (discussing the formation of special purpose vehicles).
22See Id. at 568 (asserting, "the first fundamental structural variation occurs in the legal form of the
special purpose vehicle or special purpose vehicles used to effectuate a structured financing ...
commonly used forms include the corporation, grantor trust and owner trust. Less commonly used
are business cooperatives, limited partnerships and limited liability companies.")
23See Committee, supra note 2 (stating, "The SPV is typically a newly created entity with no prior
business activities that could have given rise to preexisting creditors, or potential tort, environmental
or other claims.").
24See Ellis, supra note 14, at 307 (explaining that firms can minimize the likelihood of involuntary
petitions through contractual covenants and prohibiting the SPV to have unsecured creditors).
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be taken to keep the assets out of the estate of an Originator in the event of its
own bankruptcy.
Originators have the option to create their own SPV or to use an
existing SPV known as a "multi-seller securitization conduit. '26 Multi-seller
securitization conduits allow Originators to minimize their transaction costs by
selling their receivables to a single pre-existing SPV. 2 7 Commercial and
investment banks usually administer such conduits in order to achieve
economies of28
scale by allowing multiple Originators to sell receivables to a preexisting SPV.
Originators that choose to create their own SPVs, instead of using a
multi-seller securitization conduit, can structure them in a various ways.29
Generally, the Originator will use what is known as a "one-off" structure,
through which it will offer securities to investors publicly or through private
placement. 30 One-off structures involve high transaction costs because the SPVs
are created for that one particular transaction. 3' Furthermore, it is usually
necessary for a third party "credit enhancement facility" such as a bank or surety
company to guarantee the repayment of securities issued
in a one-off
32
securitization structure, thus adding to the transaction costs.
The most commonly used one-off structures utilize two-tiers of SPVs
in order to protect investors from the risk of the Originators bankruptcy and in
turn lower their own cost of capital.33 Using this method, the Originator will
transfer receivables to a wholly owned first-tier SPV ("SPV 1") in a transaction
that constitutes a "true sale ' 34 for bankruptcy purposes.3 5 Next, SPV1 will
25See Lupica, supra note 10, at 618 (stating in bankruptcy remote structure assets are removed from
purview of Originator's Trustee in bankruptcy); See also Committee, supra note 6, at 536 (stating the
structured financing market understands that "bankruptcy remote" does not mean "bankruptcy
proof').
26See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 140 ("A 'multiseller securitization conduit' offers
Originators the opportunity to minimize their transaction costs by utilizing a common SPV.").
27Id. at 140 (stating "these conduits are typically administered by commercial or investment banks
and are able to achieve a transaction cost economy of scale by allowing multiple Originators to sell
receivable to a single pre-existing SPV.").
28See Adam Grant, Ziggy Stardust Reborn: A ProposedModification of the Bowie Bond, 22
CARDozo L. REv. 1291, 1310 (2001) (stating "the primary benefit of multi-seller securitization
conduit is that it allows Originators who would not traditionally be able to afford the transaction
costs of one-off securitizations to engage in securitization.").
29 See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 138 (describing "one-off' securitization structures).
3 Id.
31Id.
32
1d. at 139.
33See Committee, supra note 2, at 573 (asserting, "[a] widely used method of providing investor
protection in a structured financing while retaining structural integrity involves the use of two or
more special purpose entities in a 'multi-tier' structure."); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 142
(stating bankruptcy risk is minimized by use of a two tier structure).
34See notes 94 - 116, infra for a discussion on what constitutes a "true sale."
35See Dawson, supra note 7, at 388 (stating, "to avoid the risk that bankruptcy may cause a court to
deem some or all of the assets transferred to the intermediate SPV to be part of the transferor's
bankruptcy estate, ... each transfer should be structured as a 'true sale."'); Schwarcz, Alchemy,
supra note 1, at 142 (asserting bankruptcy risk is minimized by selling receivables to a wholly
owned SPV in a transaction constituting a "true sale").

31
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transfer the assets to a second-tier SPV ("SPV2") in a transaction that constitutes
a sale for accounting purposes.36 SPV2 will then sell the securities to investors
backed by the assets to pay the Originator.37 After SPV2 has paid off the
securities to the investors it will transfer back any remaining receivables and
collections to SPV1.38 SPVl will then transfer the funds back to the Originator
as dividends or simply be merged into the Originator.39
The "true sale" nature of the transfer from the Originator to SPVI
insulates the assets from the Originator's possible bankruptcy and the risk the
assets will be subject to an automatic stay. 40 The transfer from SPV1 to SPV2
allows SPV 1 to provide an "internal credit enhancement" to the investors at the
SPV2 level through the retention of a subordinated interest in the assets. 4'
Subordinated interests protect senior classes by absorbing defaults before the
senior position's cash flows are disrupted.
During its formation, the Originator will take the necessary steps to
make the SPVs "bankruptcy remote." The charter and by-laws of the SPV will
contain restrictions on its business activities.42 The SPVs will be prohibited
from incurring additional debt beyond that of the asset-backed securities and
obligations to credit enhancers and liquidity providers.43 Restricting the SPVs'
business activities and allowing it to only incur debt necessary or incidental to
the financing will limit the amount of creditors and the potential for an
involuntary bankruptcy petition to be filed. 44 Further, language will be included
restricting the SPVs' ability to subject the securitized assets to voluntary liens.45

36See Dawson, supra note 7, at 400 (stating, "[a] true sale of an asset is a transfer that is effective
against the transferor, its creditors, its regulator, its liquidator or receiver, and can be enforced
against the borrower ... such a transfer legally separates the credit risk of the assets from that of the
transferor."); Committee, supra note 2, at 573 (stating, "the transfer of those assets from SPV1 to
SPV2 will be an accounting sale, but not a true sale, and forms the basis for a financing with a
commercially acceptable level of credit enhancement.").
" See Id.
38 id.
39
See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 142.
4o See Committee, supra note 2, at 542.
41See Committee, supra note 2, at 573 (maintaining if transfers are properly structured an acceptable
level of credit enhancement will be formed).
42See Schwarcz, Structured Finance, supra note 4, at 614 (stating, "this limitation
normally is
accomplished by drafting the SPVs charter or articles of incorporation or other organizational
documents... ").
43See Committee, supra note 2, at 554 (noting that debt of the SPV is limited to asset-backed
securities, obligations to credit enhancers and liquidity providers); See Dawson, supra note 7, at 392
(stating that "the entity should be restricted from incurring additional debt.").
"See Id., at 554 (stating, "the activities of an SPV are restricted to those necessary or incidental to
the filing."); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note i, at 135 (reasoning by limiting SPV's business
activities prevent creditors from having claims against SPV).
45See Committee, supra note 2, at 555 (stating that "the constituent documents typically provide that
the securitized assets cannot be subject to a voluntary lien or security interest in favor of anyone
other than the holders of the asset-backed securities, except to the extent those assets are permitted to
be pledged to a provider of credit enhancement or liquidity support.").
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It has been held to be against public policy to completely prohibit an
SPV from filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition. 46 However, the Originator can
take steps to restrict the SPVs' ability to file for bankruptcy protection. 7 The
SPVs' articles of incorporation will contain a provision requiring a unanimous
vote by the board of directors to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition.48 The
SPVs will have at least one "independent director" 49 on the board of directors in
order to minimize the possibility that the Originator, for its own purposes, can
influence the board of an SPV to file for bankruptcy.50 However, this technique
is not a guarantee that an SPV will never file a voluntary bankruptcy petition
because the fiduciary duties of all the directors includes creditors as an entity
approaches insolvency.5
The Originator will also take certain steps to reduce the risk of the
SPVs being forced into bankruptcy by the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy
petition. 52 One safeguard is to make sure the SPVs are sufficiently funded so
that they can meet obligations to creditors as they come due.5 3 In addition, the
Originator may be able to reduce this risk through contractual agreements. 4
The transfer of the assets from the Originator to SPV 1 will typically be
in the contractual form of an absolute assignment. 55 The objective is to fully
46See Ellis, supra note 14, at 307 (stating "as a general principle, waivers or prohibitions on
bankruptcy petitions are void as a matter of public policy.").
47Id. at 309 (stating "the charter restrictions in a typical securitization expressly negate the boards
discretion to file a bankruptcy petition.").
'8 See Committee, supra note 2, at 555 (stating "a super-majority vote, necessarily including all or at
least one of the independent directors, is required in order for the board of directors to approve a
voluntary bankruptcy.").
49See James F. Penrose, Special-PurposeEntities in Project FinanceTransactions,S&P
STRUCTURED FINANCE, Nov. 1995, at 73 (" 'Independent Director' means a duly appointed member
of the board of directors, who shall not have been, at the time of such appointment or at any time in
the preceding five years, (a) a direct or indirect legal or beneficial owner, (b) a creditor, supplier,
employee, officer, director, family member, manager, or contractor of such entity or one of its
affiliates.").
50See Ellis, supra note 14, at 308 (stating "the real issues that need to be addressed are opportunistic
insolvency petitions that come about when the issuer's management seeks to benefit itself, or some
other interest group, through the reorganization process ... to deal with this problem, securitizations
rely on the form of the issuer to reduce the likelihood of a voluntary petition.").
51See In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting "it is
universally agreed that when a corporation approaches insolvency or actually becomes insolvent,
directors fiduciary duties expand to include general creditors.").
52
See 11 U.S.C. 303(b) (2003) (allowing for an involuntary bankruptcy petition); See also
Committee, supra note 2, at 557 (explaining "structuring can be done to reduce the likelihood of
involuntary bankruptcy.").
53See Lahny, supra note 17, at 837 (asserting, "the Originator should be sure that the SPV is
properly funded to eliminate foreseeable obligations as they come due for payment.").
4See Committee, supra note 2, at 558 (stating, "in order to substantially reduce the risk of an
involuntary filing, all or most of the consensual creditors of the SPV may be required to sign an
agreement not to file an involuntary bankruptcy case against the SPV until at least 366 days after the
asset backed securities have been paid."); Dawson, supra note 7, at 393 (stating, the transaction
documents should contain a covenant preventing the parties from filing, instigating or joining in any
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the entity so long as the rated securities are
outstanding.").
55See Committee, supra note 2, at 533.
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remove the assets from the ownership of the Originator to the SPV in what
constitutes a "true sale."56 However, whether the transfer is a "true sale" is not
determined by the intent of the parties, but upon a judicial characterization of the
transaction. 57
After the SPVs have been properly structured and the assets transferred,
the SPV's interest will be perfected by the filing of a U.C.C.-l statement.58 The
purpose of perfection is to "place third parties on notice of the transfer of the
interest in the receivables, so they will not
be misled when extending credit to or
59
otherwise dealing with the Originator."

II.

THE BENEFITS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION

Rather than relying on an erratic payment stream of receivables,
businesses prefer having cash up front for use in research and development and
payment of dividends to shareholders. 60 Asset-backed securitization improves a
firms overall liquidity. 61 Liquidity enables the firm to pursue long-term
investment opportunities and meet current payment obligations, while increasing
overall creditworthiness.62 In addition, the increase in cash flow provides the
firm with a significant competitive advantage.
Asset-backed securitization provides firms with access to lower cost
debt by structuring the transactions so that the securitized assets are "bankruptcy
remote.,, 63 Assets are bankruptcy remote when they are held by an entity that is
unlikely to become insolvent or be subject to claims by creditors. 64 Therefore,
in a properly structured asset-backed securitization, the assets transferred by the
Originator to the SPV and used to back the securities will not be deemed part of
the Originator's bankruptcy estate should a petition be filed.65 Bankruptcy
remoteness allows rating agencies to consider only the character and quality of
the underlying asset or payment stream, rather than examining the Originator for
561d
57See Jeffrey E. Bjork, Seeking Predictabilityin Bankruptcy: An Alternative to Judicial
Recharacterizationin Structured Financing,14 BANK. DEV. J. 119, 124 (1997) [hereinafter Bjork]
(stating, "A true sale, in reality, is more a product ofjudicial characterization of a transaction than it
is an intended creation between the seller and as SPV."); See also Discussion infra notes 94 - 116.
8See Schwarcz, Structured Finance, supra note 4, at 37.
59Id.
60See George W. Galliger & P. Basil Healy, LIQUIDITY ANALYSiS AND MANAGEMENT 41-42 (2d ed.
1991).
61See Committee, supra note 2, at 531 (noting, "structured financings of receivables also can
accelerate the receipt of cash flows, allowing the quicker redeployment of the proceeds of those
assets."); Lupica, supra note 10, at 609 (stating, "all Originators who securitize their assets enjoy an
improvement in asset liquidity management.").
62See Lupica, supra note 10, at 610 (stating, "the transformation of a future payment stream into
immediate cash may further enable an Originator to pursue a potentially profitable project or merely
meet its regular obligations.").
63See Committee, supra note 2, at 530 (stating, "one of the principal benefits from structured
financings is a reduction in the cost of financing.").
64See Legalities in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities, CreditReview, Oct. 25, 1993, at 10.
65See discussion infra notes 94 - 116 and accompanying text.
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its creditworthiness. 66 This financing structure removes some risk for the
investors, leading to higher ratings from the agencies for securities issued by the
SPV rather than the Originator.67
Asset-backed securitization also provides firms with advantages
through its treatment by accounting rules as compared with other forms of
financing.68 A transfer with recourse is one in which the Originator agrees to
either repurchase defaulting loans or compensate the SPV for any losses caused
by defaulting loans. 69 A transfer without recourse is a transfer in which the
Originator gives up the option to repurchase the receivables at a later date.70
Under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 71 a transfer of
assets in connection with a structured finance transaction is treated as a sale so
long as the transfer is made without "recourse., 72 Therefore, the off-balance
sheet nature of the sale will benefit the firm by improving its financial ratios.73
I.

BANKRUPTCY ATTACKS ON ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION

Rating agencies give high ratings to asset-backed securities issued by
SPVs because of the many steps taken to separate the assets from the bankruptcy
estate of the Originator.74 However, if the Originator ultimately does wind up in
bankruptcy, the Creditors, trustee or debtor-in-possession may attempt to attack
the securitization transaction and include the assets in the bankruptcy estate.
There are four common types of bankruptcy attacks on the asset
transfer in an asset-backed securitization. First, the transfer is subject to
fraudulent transfer law. However, as will be discussed, these transactions
generally do not fail based on fraud per se. Second, there is the type of attack
used in Octagon Gas Systems Inc. v. Rimmer,75 which stands for the proposition
66See Lupica, supra note 10, at 614 (explaining, "it is the character and quality of the assets that are

under the rating agencies' intense scrutiny.").
67See Id. at 613 (stating, "in cases where the Originator's credit rating is deficient, the capital
markets (meaning the rating agencies) may give a higher credit rating to the asset backed securities
issued by the SPC than to the securities issued by the Originator directly.").
68See Id. at 614-15 (explaining Accounting-Related Advantages to Asset Securitization).
69Id. atn. 107.
70 Id.
71The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is a widely accepted set of rules,
conventions, standards and procedures for reporting financial information, as established by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board. See www.investorwords.com.
72The Financial Accounting Standards Board defines recourse as: "The right of a transferee of
receivables to receive payment from the transferor of those receivables for: (a) failure of the debtors
to pay when due, (b) the effects of prepayments, or (c) adjustments resulting from defects in the
eligibility of the transferred receivables."
73Lupica, supra note 10, at 616. (explaining that securitization "benefits a firm by improving its
financial ratios, allowing it to stay within the ratios found in the firm's other loan document
covenants, or to simply enable it to channel scarce capital to its business segments that may be in
need.").
74See Dawson, supra note 7, at 383 (stating, "[a] true structured finance (or securitization) legally
isolates assets from a transferor's insolvency to enable a purchaser of securities backed by the assets
to rely solely on the creditworthiness of those assets.").
" 995 F.2d 948 (10' Cir. 1993).
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that based on the U.C.C. Article 9, even true sales of accounts and chattel paper
do not remove assets from the bankruptcy estate. However, as will be discussed,
this attack is no longer applicable since the revision of the U.C.C. Article 9.
The third and fourth common bankruptcy attacks are still effective and often
raised when an Originator enters bankruptcy. Under such circumstances, the
Bankruptcy Court will address whether the asset transfer is a true sale and
whether substantive consolidation is appropriate. As one commentator stated,
"the potential problems associated with [asset-backed] securitization in the
bankruptcy context are76 properly attributable to inconsistent judicial evaluation
of these transactions."

A.

ERA UDULENT TRANSFER LAW

The sale of assets from an Originator to an SPV qualifies as a "transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property," and thus will be subject to fraudulent
transfer analysis. 77 Fraudulent transfer law allows the trustee to avoid prepetition transfers by the debtor through state law and the Code.78
Section 548 (a)(1)(A) of the Code requires an actual intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors for the court to find fraudulent transfer. 79 Generally,
an Originator's actual intent to defraud is an independent circumstance not
necessarily attributable to the structure of the asset-backed securitization and can
be avoided through the vigilance of the attorneys involved.80 Section 548
(a)(1)(B) of the Code identifies conduct that amounts to a constructive
fraudulent transfer.81 The elements of a constructive fraudulent transfer are that
See Bjork, supra note 57, at 122.
77See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2003) (stating, "the Trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor ... subject to various conditions.").
78 See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2003) (permitting Trustees to use longer reach-back periods provided by
76

state law fraudulent transfer statutes, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, or Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act); Lupica, supra note 10, at 647, n. 265-66 (discussing the Code's incorporation of
state fraudulent transfer law).
7911 U.S.C. § 548(a)(t)(A) (2003) provides:
(a)(1) The Trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation
incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntary (A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, indebted...
w See Lupica, supra note 10, at 648 (stating, "the harm faced by the Originator's unsecured creditors
as a result of the fraud in not necessarily attributable to securitization as a method of financing, but
the Originator's fraudulent behavior.").
8' 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2003) provides:
(a)(1) The Trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation
incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(BXi) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation;
and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
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the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value, and was either
insolvent at the time of the transaction, rendered insolvent as a result of the
transaction, or left unable to pay its debts as they come due.82
In practice, "due to the scrutiny imposed by rating agencies, credit
enhancers, and the various other market participants, securitization may present
fewer opportunities for self-dealing than alternative financing methods," making
the applicability of fraudulent transfer law to asset-backed securitization
unlikely.83

B.

OCTAGON GAS

In 1993, the securitization industry was shaken by dictum in a decision
handed down by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.84 In Octagon Gas, the
court addressed the question of whether the property claimed by a sale transferee
was part of the transferor's bankruptcy estate and thus subject to the interests of
the creditors.
The case involved a business that bought and resold natural gas.85 The
business transferred to Mr. Rimmer, an "overriding royalty interest" in gross
proceeds from the gas sold. 86 After the filing of the debtor's Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition, the court was asked to determine whether the interest in the
proceeds was property of the bankruptcy estate. Pursuant to section 541 of the
Code, a bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case."87
The court found that Mr. Rimmer's interest was an "account" for
U.C.C. Article 9 purposes.88 Upon further analysis of Article 9, the court stated
that, "these provisions clearly indicate that the buyer of an account is treated as a
secured party, his interest in the account is treated as a security interest, the
seller of the account is a debtor, and the account sold is treated as collateral." 89
The court concluded that "Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral

(II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for
which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or
(tt1) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
82 Id.
83See Lupica, supra note 10, at 648.
8 See Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve Inc.), 995 F.2d 948 ( 10 1 Cir.
1993) (holding account is part of bankruptcy estate); David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations
of Securitization,39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1059 (1998) [hereinafter Carlson] (recognizing the
impact and reaction caused by Octagon Gas System's holding).
8
See Id. at 958.
'6SeeId. at 951.
87Id. at 955 (quoting It U.S.C. § 541(aXl) (1988)).
8 See Id. at 955 (defining the interest acquired to be an account); See also U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995)
(amended 2001) (defining account as "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper).
8 Octagon Gas, 955 F.2d, at 956.
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would place Rimmer's account within the property of [the seller's] bankruptcy
estate." 90
The decision in Octagon Gas was not well received by the
Securitization industry because if adopted nationwide it would place securitized
accounts or chattel paper 9' in the Originator's bankruptcy estate regardless of all
other factors. In fact, the decision prompted the U.C.C. Permanent Editorial
Board to issue a commentary disagreeing with the Octagon Gas decision.92
Furthermore, it prompted the U.C.C. Drafting Committee to propose an
amendment to the U.C.C. Article 9 explicitly addressing 93
the issue of whether
sold accounts are property of the seller's bankruptcy estate.
The result was Revised Article 9 that includes the Permanent Editorial
Board's commentary and a revised section 9-318(a) which states, "(a) [Seller
retains no interest.] A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment
intangible or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the
collateral sold." Therefore, the bankruptcy attack used in Octagon Gas is no
longer available to Trustees and debtors.

C.

TRUE SALE V. DISGUISED SECURED LOAN

In bankruptcy, any property in which the debtor has an interest is
in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 94 "True sales" are those that are
against creditors and the estate of a bankrupt Originator, so that the
is no longer "property of the debtor's estate" under Section 541 of the
It is critical to the success of the asset-backed securitization that the
of the assets from the Originator to the SPV are "true sales" so that
of the bankrupt Originator are unable to reach the payment stream.96
Should the Originator enter bankruptcy, the court will decide the
question of whether the transfer was a sale of assets or a loan secured by the
assets. The court will look to substance over form in determining the true nature
of the transaction. 7 If the court deems the transfer from the Originator to the
included
effective
property
Code. 95
transfers
creditors

90Id.at 955.
91

"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a

security interest in or a lease of specific goods, but a charter or other contract involving the use or
hire of a vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced both by such a security
agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken
together constitutes chattel paper. U.C.C. § 5-105(b)(1) (1998).
92Commentary No. 14 (U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1994)).
93See Lupica, supra note 10, at 658.
1
9411 U.S.C. § 541(aX ) (2003) (providing bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.").
95See Schwarz, Structured Finance, supra note 4, at 28-29.
96See Steven L. Schwarcz, The PartsAre Greater Than The Whole: How Securitization of Divisible
Interests Can Revolutionize Structures Financeand Open The CapitalMarkets to Middle Market
Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139, 143 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Parts] (explaining the
importance of a "true sale").
97In re Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 482 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (quoting Grant
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 2.6, at 47 (1965)) ("Courts will determine the true

38
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SPV to be a secured loan, the assets will become part of the Originator's
bankruptcy estate and subject to the automatic stay.98 Therefore, the transaction
must be structured as a "true sale" to be acceptable to the banks and for the
securities to receive a high rating from the rating agencies.
The majority of the courts will evaluate several factors to determine
whether the transaction is a true sale or merely a disguised secured loan
transaction. "These factors include but are not limited to: (1) the degree to
which the risk of loss is transferred to the special purpose vehicle; (2) the
amount of recourse against the transferor; (3) the degree of control exercised by
the transferor over the transferred assets; (4) the purchase price paid; (5) and the
contractually expressed intent of the parties." 99
The court's decision may also be influenced by whether the Originator
is in Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapter 11 reorganization. 1° In the context of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the consequence of the court treating the
transaction as a loan would only serve to delay payment to the SPV, assuming
the security interest in the assets were perfected. 01' Therefore, a court may be
willing to accept the transaction as a sale because ultimately the SPV will obtain
the property anyway.
In the case of a Chapter 11 debtor, however, if the court determines the
transfer was a loan and thus part of the bankruptcy estate, the court may permit
the debtor to "use, sell or lease" such property, so long as others with an interest
receive "adequate protection."' 10 2
This determination would permit the
Originator to retain control of the cash flow and would be invaluable to the
insolvent company's rehabilitation. In light of this, the court may be less willing
to treat the transfer as true sale, thus removing this cash resource from the
estate. 3
Recourse refers to the risk the Originator retains in the transaction.104
The extent and nature of the recourse that the SPV has against the Originator is a
major factor courts will consider to determine whether a transaction is a true sale

nature of a security transaction, and will not be prevented from exercising their function ofjudicial
review by the form of words the parties may have chosen.").
98
See Dawson, supra note 7, at 388-89 (stating, "to avoid the risk that bankruptcy may cause a court
to deem some or all of the assets transferred to the intermediate SPE [special purpose entity] to be
part of the transferor's bankruptcy estate (and thus subject to the automatic stay or distribution to
other creditors of the transferor), each transfer should be structured as a 'true sale."').
' See Bjork, supra note 57, at 128.
1oo
See Robert D. Aicher and William J. Fellerhoff, Characterizationof a Transfer of Receivables As
a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor,65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 183 (1991)

[hereinafter Aicher] (stating, "Whether the debtor is a liquidating or a rehabilitating debtor could
influence a court's decision to uphold sale treatment.").
101
See Id.
10211 U.S.C. § 363(e)(2003); See Aicher, supra note 100, at 184 (explaining, "A court in a
rehabilitation, as opposed to a liquidation, might be less willing to view the transfer as a sale, since
such a determination will remove from the estate cash flow which the debtor may desperately need
for a successful rehabilitation.").
'03 See
0

Aicher, supra note 100, at 184.

'4Id.at 183.
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or a secured loan.1 °5 If recourse is present, the issue is "whether the nature of
the recourse, and the true nature of the transaction, are such that the legal rights
and economic consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a
financing transaction [a secured loan] or to a sale."' 10 6 As the degree of recourse
increases, so does the chance the court will find the transfer was a disguised
secured loan. However, the courts have10 7 established a clear standard for
determining a satisfactory level of recourse.
The existence of a right or obligation to repurchase the assets is a form
of recourse that would indicate a loan instead of a true sale. For example, in
Major'sFurnitureMart v. Castle Credit Corp.,0 8 the Third Circuit held that the
sale of accounts with "full recourse," with monies from the purchase price held
back against future nonpaying accounts, as well as an agreement requiring the
seller to repurchase delinquent accounts, constituted a disguised loan.
Accordingly, in Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of California, Inc.), 1 9 the
Ninth Circuit held a transfer made "without recourse," with no guarantee of
repayment or compensation was a true sale.
Although courts recognize recourse to the Originator as an important
factor indicative of a secured loan, recourse alone, without other factors0
suggesting a loan, will not necessarily preclude true sale treatment."
Furthermore, because the SPV is contracting to buy valid rights to payment,
warranties relating to title, validity, and eligibility of receivables are forms of
recourse that are not indicative of a secured loan."'
An agreement that the Originator retains the right to surplus collections
once the SPV has collected its investment plus an agreed yield would be
indicative of a secured loan." 2 Likewise, the retention of surplus collections by
the SPV would indicate the transaction was a true sale.
If the sale price of the receivables were based upon a fluctuating
interest index, this would indicate the transaction was a true sale. Likewise, if
the price is retroactively adjusted based on actual collections rather than agreed
upon based expected collections, this would indicate a secured loan." 3

105

See Aicher, supra note 100, at 186 ("Recourse can take the form of a repurchase obligation, a

guaranty of collectability by the [Originator], a failure to extinguish or reduce an independent
obligation for
which an 'absolute assignment' was made, or a hold back of reserves from the
purchase price which are released to the [Originator] only as receivables are paid.").
106
Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir. 1979).
107 See Bjork, supra note 57, at 125 (stating, "the courts have failed to clearly articulate what
constitutes an acceptable level of recourse in a sale transaction.").
108602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d Cir. 1979).
0982 B.R 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).
0
11
See Id.at 545; People v. Service Institute Inc., 101 Misc.2d 549, 421 NYS.2d 325, 327 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
. See Committee, supra note 2, (stating, "Warranties relating to title, validity and eligibility of
receivables (as opposed to collectibility of receivables) normally do not have a loss recourse
component.").
112
See, e.g., In re Nixon Mach. Co., 6 BR. 847, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); Evergreen Valley
Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 661-62 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
"3 See Schwarcz, Parts, supra note 96, at 147.
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The administration and control over the collection of the receivables
are additional factors the court will consider in determining the nature of the
transaction." 4 If the transaction is a true sale, the SPV should have the authority
to control collection of the payments. Therefore, in the case where collection of
the receivables has clearly remained in the control of the Originator, the court is
more likely to deem the transaction a secured loan. However, under certain
circumstances it is more economically efficient for the Originator rather than the
SPV to act as a "servicer."" 15 In that case, 16it is important for the SPV to deal
with the Originator on an arms-length basis."
D.

THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

Substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy of the court that
involves pooling the assets and liabilities of two or more separate entities, and
results in the claims by creditors of one to be treated as claims against the
common fund." 7 "Deficiencies in structural separation" between the Originator
and SPV
may result in their substantive consolidation by the Bankruptcy
118
Court.
Substantive consolidation is a judicial creation arising from the court's
equity jurisdiction pursuant to section 105(a) of the Code. 119 It is widely
accepted that courts have the power to substantively consolidate a debtor
corporation and a solvent non-debtor affiliate. 20 Accordingly, a court may
decide to substantively consolidate the Originator and an SPV if the market
perceives them as one entity and the creditors interests are equitably served by
consolidation.1 21 In general, courts have expressed a reluctance to consolidate
...
Id.at 148.
115A servicer monitors and collects the receivables and administers the cash flow of the asset pool.
Committee, supra note 2, at 550.
116See Id.(explaining, "the seller-servicer should be paid, and take into income for tax and
accounting purposes, a servicing fee equivalent to that which would be paid to a third-party
servicer.").
11 See Mary Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: DecipheringSubstantive Consolidation,59 U. PITT. L.
ReV. 381 (1998) (describing substantive consolidation as "the effective merger of two or more
legally distinct (albeit affiliated) entities into a single debtor with a common pool of assets and a
common pool of liabilities.").
"' See Bjork, supra note 57, at 136.
"9 Section 105(a) provides:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party
in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent
an abuse of process. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2003); See In re Baker & Getty Financial Services, Inc., 78
B.R. 139, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (observing court's authority to order substantive
consolidation arises from its equity jurisdiction pursuant to section 105(a)).
120
See generally, J. Stephen Gilbert, Substantive Consolidationin Bankruptcy: A Primer,43 VAND.
L. REv. 207, 210 (1990) (discussing the judicial doctrine of substantive consolidation).
121See In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11, 13-15 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (Ordering the
substantive consolidation of an SPV and Originator based on findings that the transfer involved the
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affiliated corporations because of the risk to creditors who would be negatively
22
impacted, for instance the investors in the securities issued by the SPV.
However, there is authority to support the23 consolidation of a non-debtor SPV
into the bankruptcy case of an Originator.1
The court in In re Vecco ConstructionIndustries, Inc. identified seven
factors that should be considered in deciding whether to order substantive
consolidation. 2 4 These factors are:
(1) the presence or absence of consolidated financial
statements,
(2) the unity of interests and ownership between the
various corporate entities,
(3) the existence of parent and inter-corporate
guarantees and loans,
(4) the degree of difficulty in segregating and
ascertaining individual assets and liabilities,
(5) the transfer of assets without formal observance
of corporate formalities,
(6) the commingling of assets and business functions,
and
(7) the profitability
25 of consolidation at a single
physical location.1
Clearly the risk of substantive consolidation and fear that the court can
bring a solvent affiliated SPV into an Originator's bankruptcy proceeding is a
major concern for the securitization industry. In response, rating agencies will
require that the Originator's counsel provide a "non-consolidation opinion,"
representing that all steps have been taken to minimize the chance that
the court
26
will substantively consolidate the Originator and its affiliated SPV.'

IV.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION

A.

IN RE L TV STEEL

In early 2001 the securitization industry was again shaken to its core by
another court decision. William T. Bodoh, United States Bankruptcy Judge for
commingling of bank accounts, payment of expenses from a joint account, an entangled relationship
among the parties, and the reliance by creditors on the credit of the consolidated debtors.).
122In re DRW Property Co., 54 B.R. 489, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (refusing to order a

substantive consolidation because the potential for harm to creditors outweighs the benefits).
123 See,

e.g., Bracaglia v. Manzo (In re United Stairs Corp.), 176 B.R. 359, 369 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995)

(allowing substantive consolidation of a non-debtor after applying a balancing of equities test); In re
1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 15 B.R. 89, 96-97 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (relying on traditional
veil-piercing
jurisprudence in reaching its decision to substantively consolidate).
24
1 See In re Vecco Constr. Indust., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
5
12 id.
26
" See Committee, supra note 2, at 595-606 (providing "Form of Non-Consolidation Opinion").
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the Northern District of Ohio, wrote an opinion in LTV Steel Company's ("LTV
Steel") Chapter 11 case, questioning the legal foundation of asset-backed
securitization. 127 The decision authorized the use of cash collateral despite the
prior absolute transfer of the debtor's present and future receivables to an SPV.
LTV Steel is one of the largest manufacturers of integrated steel
products in the United States. The company employs approximately 17,500
people and provides medical coverage and other benefits to approximately
100,000 retirees and their dependants. Prior to commencement of this Chapter
11 case, LTV
Steel entered into a series of asset-backed securitization
8
transactions.12
In 1994, after a successful emergence from a previous Chapter 11
reorganization, LTV Steel created a wholly owned subsidiary SPV called LTV
Sales Finance Co. ("Sales Finance"), which it intended to be a bankruptcy
remote entity. LTV Steel then transferred its present and future accounts
receivable to Sales Finance on a continuing basis. Abbey National, a large
financial institution located in the United Kingdom, agreed to loan $270 Million
to Sales Finance in exchange for129Sales Finance granting Abbey National a
security interest in the receivables.
In 1998, LTV Steel created another wholly owned subsidiary SPV
called LTV Steel Products, LLC ("Steel Products"), which was also intended to
be a bankruptcy remote entity. LTV entered into an agreement to sell all of its
rights, title and interest in its present and future inventory to Steel Products on a
continuing basis. Chase Manhattan and several other financial institutions then
agreed to loan13Steel
Products $30 Million in exchange for a security interest in
0
the inventory.
On December 29, 2000, LTV Steel and 48 of its subsidiaries filed
voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Code. Among the motions
made at the first-day hearings was a motion to use cash collateral, including the
receivables sold to Sales Finance and the inventory sold to Steel Products. LTV
Steel stated at the hearing that it would be forced to shut its doors and cease
operations if it did not receive authorization from the court
to use the cash
31
collateral. Abbey National was not present at the hearing.'
The court granted the motion on an interim basis after determining the
order was necessary to permit LTV Steel to continue business operations. The
court found "that the interests of Abbey National and all other creditors who had
an interest in the cash collateral were adequately protected by the order, and that
entry of the order was in the best interests of the estate and creditors of the
estate." 32 The court scheduled a hearing for a final order approving the full
usage of cash collateral.

127
See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
128
Id.at 279.
129Id. at 280.
130id.
131Id.

132
Id.at 281.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

17

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2

Thereafter, Abbey National made a motion to vacate the interim cash
collateral order. It argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over the
property of Sales Finance and Steel Products because LTV Steel had sold them
and therefore the court exceeded its authority by permitting LTV Steel to use the
assets.
The court ignored prior judicial recognition of asset-backed
securitizations and denied Abbey National's motion. 133 The court agreed that
absent the use of the cash collateral LTV Steel would be forced to close its doors
and would be unable to successfully reorganize. Finding an equitable interest in
the receivables and inventory to be property of LTV Steel's bankruptcy estate
under section 541(a), the court concluded that it was "sufficient to support the
entry of the interim cash collateral order. 134 In the decision, the court stated:
There seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest
that [LTV Steel] does not retain at least an equitable
interest in the property that is subject to the interim
order. [LTV Steel]'s business requires it to purchase,
melt, mold and cast various metal products. To
suggest that [LTV Steel] lacks some ownership
interest in products that it creates with its own labor
as well the proceeds
to be derived from that labor, is
135
difficult to accept.
The courts reasoning appears to have been influenced by the inventory
securitization, which was wholly separate from the receivables securitization.
However, the sweeping language of the opinion cannot be confined to those
facts. The court relied on a public policy argument to support its result, stating:
Allowing Abbey National to modify the order would
allow Abbey National to... look to the collateral in
satisfaction of this debt. This circumstance would put
an immediate end to Debtor's business, would put
thousands of people out of work, would deprive
100,000 retirees of needed medical benefits, and
would have more far reaching economic effects on
the geographic areas where Debtor does business.
However, maintaining the current status quo permits
Debtor to remain in business while it searches for
substitute financing, and adequately
protects and
36
preserves Abbey National's rights.1
Finally, the court held that Abbey National had adequate protection for
its property interests because it had been given a replacement lien. Abbey

Id.at 287.
Id.at 20.
131
See LTV Steel, at 19-20.
136Id at 20-21.
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National argued that since the pre-petition receivables were being rapidly
depleted, its position was threatened. The court's response to that argument was
that the "Debtor's use of the pre-petition receivables will inevitably lead to an
increase in the value of post-petition receivables and inventory, in which Abbey
National has a security interest ...
Thereafter, the court granted motions for certain parties to appear
Amicus Curiae and submit memoranda in opposition to LTV Steel's motion for
an Order granting final authority to use cash collateral. Mayer, Brown & Platt
submitted a memorandum on behalf of a cross section of participants in the
securitization market. 38 Sullivan & Cromwell submitted a memorandum on
behalf of Clearing 13House
Association L.L.C., an association of twelve leading
9
commercial banks.
The Mayer, Brown & Platt memorandum characterized LTV Steel's
argument as "challenging the very concept of a true sale or true contribution
from a parent to a subsidiary."'' 40 Mayer, Brown & Platt's argument was that
asset-backed securitization is based upon long recognized economic and legal
principles that allow parent corporations to transact business with wholly owned
subsidiaries, limited only by good faith and fair dealing.' 41 The memorandum
indicated that the securitization market has become a major component of the
United States economy, citing the Bond Market Associations estimate that over
the past ten years, more than $9.3 trillion in asset-backed term securities
(excluding commercial paper) were issued in the United States. 42 The
memorandum cautioned the court that a decision accepting LTV Steel's
"extreme legal arguments" could cause "a seismic disruption in the capital
143
markets."

131Id at 22.
138The memorandum identifies the cross-section of participants that it represents as manufactures,
retailers, finance companies, lenders and institutional investors. Mayer, Brown & Platt,
Memorandum of Securitization Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Emergency Motion for Order
Granting Interim and Final Authority to Use Cash Collateral, at 1, In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001)(No. 0043866)(filed February 20,2001). Available at
http://ltv.uniscribe.net/search.asp?month=2&year-2001, last visited 3/11/03 [hereinafter Mayer,
Brown & Platt].
139Bank of America, National Association; The Bank of New York; Bank One, National
Association; Bankers Trust Company; The Chase Manhattan Bank; Citibank N.A.; European
American Bank; First Union National Bank; Fleet National Bank; HSBC Bank USA; Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York; and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association. Brief of
Amicus Curiae New York Clearing House Association, L. L. C., in Opposition to Debtor's
Emergency Motion for an Order Granting Authority To Use Cash Collateral, at 1, In re LTV Steel
Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 200 1)(No. 00-43866Xfiled February 20, 2001) available at
http://Itv.uniscribe.net/search.asp?month=2&year=2001, last vitisted 3/11/03 [hereinafter Sullivan &
Cromwell].
140Mayer, Brown & Platt, at 2.
141Id at 4.
142 Id. at 7.
143Id. at 17-18.
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Sullivan and Cromwell's memorandum made similar arguments. In
addition it characterized the effort of LTV Steel as "short-sighted and narrowminded." 144 It stated:
It is short-sighted because, in an apparent effort to
gain short-term negotiating leverage, LTV is
prepared to sacrifice the very form of financing that
was successful in aiding its rehabilitation in the past
and, unless LTV prevails, could be used to aid its
current efforts at rehabilitation. It is narrow-minded
because LTV is willing to disregard the adverse
impact of its Motion on thousands of companies with
millions of employees, as well as the millions of
investors with interests in securitizations through
pension funds, mutual funds, and other investment
vehicles.145
A settlement was reached prior to the hearing on the LTV Steel's
motion for a final order approving the use of cash collateral.1 46 LTV Steel
agreed to stipulate that its prior securitization transactions were, in fact, "true
sales." Abbey National and the other lenders agreed to "roll up" Sales Finance
and Steel Products into a post-petition, debtor-in-possession loan. 4 7 The
settlement prevented the Bankruptcy Court from reaching the question of
whether the transfer from LTV to Sales Finance and Steel Products was a "true
sale."
One Commentator, Stephen L. Schwarcz believes "LTV should have
little importance as a legal precedent" because the settlement was reached and
included a summary finding that the transfers were true sales. 148 Although
others argue, the damage was already done because the decision has lead
investors to question whether the ratings
assigned to asset-backed securities are
149
accurate reflections of the actual risk.
B.

THE BANKRUPTCYREFORMACT

In 2001, it seemed as though the issues raised by the LTV Steel case
would be put to rest when both houses of the United States Congress passed

See Sullivan & Cromwell, at 3.
Id.at 3-4.
146
See In re LTV Steel Co., No 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 635 (Bankr. E.D. Ohio Mar. 20,
2001).
144

14
1

141
Id. at 17-20.
148
See Stephen L. Schwarcz, The Impact ofBankruptcy Reform on "True Sale" Determinationin
SecuritizationTransaction, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 353, 365 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz,

Impact of Bankruptcy Reform].
149
See Robert Stark, Viewing the LTV Steel ABS Opinion in its ProperContext, 27 IOWA J.CORP.
L. 211,223 (Winter 2001) (Assessing LTV Steel's importance).
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similar bankruptcy reform bills (the "Bankruptcy Reform Act"). 150Section 912
[See Appendix] of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was to create a "safe harbor" for
asset-backed securitization transactions by amending section 541 of the Code,
which defines property of the debtor's estate. 151
The new section was to exclude from the bankruptcy estate any
"eligible asset" transferred to an "eligible entity" in connection with an "assetbacked securitization."' 152 Under the new law, an Originator would be able to
accomplish removing the assets from its potential bankruptcy estate simply by
representing in writing that the eligible assets are to be "sold, contributed, or
otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing them" from the debtors
estate under bankruptcy law. 153 This law would have effectively eliminated the
substantive law criteria (i.e. recourse against the seller) used to determine
whether a transaction was a true sale of secured loan transaction. 154 Most
importantly, it would have removed the judicial discretion used in the LTV Steel
case, where the judge was influenced by LTV Steel's argument155that it would be
forced to cease operations if it could not use the cash collateral.
However, before the Congress actually enacted the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, the Enron bankruptcy raised serious concerns about the use of SPVs.
Enron used SPVs to execute its off-balance sheet transactions and to misstate
shareholder equity, ultimately leading to the collapse of the energy-trading firm.
Thereafter, Congress withdrew the "safe harbor" provision from the Bankruptcy
Reform Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress acted properly when it removed section 912 from the
Bankruptcy Reform Act. Section 912 would have explicitly eliminated the
court's authority to analyze the economics of a transaction to determine if it was
a true sale or a secured loan. Every legal standard that has been used by the
court in the past would no longer be applicable. Instead, the form of the transfer
rather than its substance would bind the court, a complete reversal of present
law.
Proponents of section 912 argue that increasing the predictability of
securitized asset's treatment under bankruptcy would lower financing costs,
increase liquidity, and achieve greater access to the capital markets for
corporations. The achieved market efficiencies, they argue, would be passed on
to consumers and businesses in the form of lower interest rates for car loans,
150

See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107 th Cong. 912 (2001); H.R. 333, 107'h Cong. 912

(2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act].
' 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2003).
152 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 150, 912(2).
153See Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 150.
14 See Schwarcz, Impact of Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 148, at 357 (stating, "The substantive
law criteria of what constitutes a bankruptcy true sale - such as the amount and nature of the
transferee's recourse against the transferor, and whether the transferor has any right to take back
transferred receivables - have simply been eliminated.").
5

See Id at 361.
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mortgages, credit card debt, and all other extensions of credit.' 56 However, this
favorable predictable treatment for financing institutions would also come at the
expense of an insolvent Originator's other lenders, creditors, tort victims,
pension funds and employees.
Asset-backed securitization is a valuable financial tool, however, there
are two sides to the coin. Although several parties may reap the benefits, others
can be negatively impacted. For instance, suppose section 912 became the law
and a bankruptcy case with similar facts as LTV Steel was commenced, the
outcome would be quite different. The court would be required to exclude the
debtor's accounts receivable and inventory from the bankruptcy estate, the
financial institutions would be able to walk away with the full value of their
securities, forcing the debtor to liquidate. The liquidation would leave all other
creditors, including the pension funds, with unsatisfied claims, employees
without jobs and shareholders without a company. Notwithstanding the
prevailing view that the LTV Steel decision was based more upon the court's
desire to save the debtor than it was based on legal principles, it did ultimately
save the company and the local economy.
Under the current law, the "true sale" analysis is based on who bears
the risk and who receives the benefits associated with owning the assets. Assets
that have been sold are not included in the bankruptcy estate, whereas assets
used as collateral for a loan are included. Section 912 would automatically
exclude the assets from the bankruptcy estate so long as a rating agency rated
one tranche of the issued securities as "investment grade."' 157 Therefore, the
rating agencies, which have no accountability except to their shareholders,
would make the true sale determination instead of the courts.
Congress acted appropriately by removing the amendment to section
541 of the Code because it is unnecessary to change the current judicial
characterization system. Such a change would only serve to benefit financing
institutions to the detriment of the smaller creditors.1 58 The asset-backed
securitization market has flourished under the current judicial scheme, despite
the courts' role, and will continue to do so without the help of Congress.

15 See Bond Market Association, letter to Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressmen F. James
Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the Senate delegation and the House of Representatives delegation to
the Conference Committee on S.420/H.R. 333 (January 30, 2002).
157
See Bankruptcy Reform Act, App. § 912 (defining asset-backed securitization as "a transaction in
which eligible assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of payment on securities,
including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental units, at least one class or tranche
of which was rated investment grade by one or more nationally recognized securities rating
organizations, when the securities were initially issued by an issuer.").
158See Law Professors letter to Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressmen F. James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman of the Senate delegation and the House of Representatives delegation to the Conference
Committee on S.420/H.R. 333 (January 23, 2002).
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